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Abstract
The veto players theory claims that there are institutional and partisan actors, indi-
vidual or collective, that act as veto points in the process of legislation. Each veto point
must give its consent for a new law to pass, thus altering the status quo. This study
investigates the role of federalism, which is generally characterized by bicameralism and
a decentralized state, as a veto player in 20 OECD states. The results suggest federal
institutions do act as important veto points and aect the likelihood of changes to a
status quo. OLS regressions and event history analyses, using methods borrowed from
Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), demonstrate the pivotal role federal institutions play in
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A federalist state, in theory, guarantees degrees of sovereignty and inuence to certain po-
litical groups, which are generally represented through geographic areas. Riker (1964) says
the term federalism applies to countries that have at least two governmental levels with
authority over (or represent) the same land and people; each level has a minimum of one
area where it has autonomous jurisdiction; and a guarantee for each level's autonomy in
its area of jurisdiction. Elazar (1997) says federalism is a polity of arenas within arenas
held together by common framing institutions and shared communications network (239).
Sharma (2005) takes another approach, federalism is not about set levels of governmental
autonomy or a distribution of authority, but rather a process that is structured by a set
of institutions, through which authority is distributed and redistributed (174). Duchacek
(1987) says there isn't any accepted theory or overarching agreement as to what, exactly,
federalism is. The term itself is unclear and controversial (189). Whatever the preferred
denition, it is an extremely important political institution. Loose confederations can be
traced back to ancient times, but the modern conception of a federal state is still only a few
centuries old.
Federalism has been studied in a variety of contexts. Perhaps foremost have been studies
in scal federalism that generally promote either advantages or drawbacks to centeralized
or decentralized policy responsibility, though some claim there is no dierence between the
two (Oates, 1991). Fiscal federalism studies have been ubiquitous within the literature
of economists and political scientists, yet the legislative and institutional implications of
federalism on producing new policies have been generally neglected.1 Many have simply
1There has been a number of signicant studies that consider in institutional importance of federalism,
however. Aside from Tsebelis' work, Lijphart (1999) perhaps produced the foremost conclusion about the
implications of federal institutions in his kinder and gentler hypothesis (Ch. 16). Though this study also
considered a series of additional institutional variables.
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assumed federalism promotes a status quo, this study aims to actually test that assumption.
I attempt to further understand the relationship between federalist institutions, which I
relate closely though not completely to bicameralism and the unitary-federal state, and the
enactment of signicant new laws. It demonstrates that federal institutions (in this case,
the extent of the federal state and strength of bicameralism) can play a signicant role in
vetoing new laws and promoting the status quo. The research question that prompted this
study was:
Do federal institutions increase the number of veto points in the legislation pro-
cess? If so, do strong federal institutions (the extent of the federal state and
strength of bicameralism) promote greater policy stability than weaker federal
institutions?
Following Tsebelis' (2002) examination of federal institutions as veto players, this study
examines how federal representation in national legislatures can act as a veto point on the
legislating of new laws. Veto players theory says there are certain institutional and partisan
actors, individual or collective, who must agree to a change of the staus quo in order to
legislate new policies. The consent of each constitutionally necessary actor, representing
veto points, must be achieved for a new law to be passed. In this study, I demonstrate
the salience of the veto players theory in respect to federal institutions. Unlike Tsebelis'
book and many articles, I am not striving to produce spatial models of federal veto players.
Rather, an empirical analysis of veto playing institutions. The goal is not to say country
A has X veto players and country B has Y, but to determine if the strength of federalist
veto playing institutions does in fact promote status quo policies and make the legislation of
new laws more dicult. Federalist veto players are, for present purposes, the extent of the
federal state and bicameralism.
This may sound a bit murky, so I will establish denitions for a few important terms
right o the bat. Federalism is the idea or concept that is witnessed in the governing process
of a federal state. A federal state is generally characterized by decentralization, though
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this is dierent from the term federalism. So federalism should be considered an abstract
conception of a particular governing structure, while a federal state (decentralization of
power and responsibility) could be considered what we actually see in the governance process.
The dierence between these terms will be discussed in greater detail in later sections. At
times, federalism is also referred to as federalist or federalisms, but each is considered the
same general abstraction of a governing structure. Finally, bicameralism is a parliament or
legislature with two chambers, a lower chamber and an upper chamber. Unicameral is a
parliament or legislature with one chamber. Weak and strong bicameralism are the terms
used to discuss the strength of bicameralism. These dierences will be hashed out in
following pages.
Federalism, as a general concept, will be captured by both the strength of the federal state
and bicameralism. Federal strength seems intuitive: States range from unitary to federal.
Though in practice this is quite arcane. These issues are discussed later, but a measure is
still needed to capture this convoluted type of state. So a federalism index is demonstrated
to capture the federal state to a reasonable extent. I will argue veto players are derived from
bicameralism based on two dimensions of symmetry and congruency (see Figure I). Strong
bicameral systems are considered to have greater symmetry and greater incongruency, thus
these systems are hypothesized to feature more veto points than weaker bicameral systems
or unicameral systems. Taken together, I argue, strong federal-bicameral states will produce
fewer signicant new laws than states with weaker federal-bicameral institutions. Unitary-
unicameral states will produce the most signicant new laws. So a strong federal-bicameral
system like that in the United States (US) would pass fewer signicant new laws than a
unitary-unicameral system like Greece.
Federalist attributes can act as veto players depending on the structure of a government.
Federalism can increase the number of veto players through bicameralism, by which a second
or upper chamber holds veto powers over legislation. Or through qualied majorities, which
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Figure I: Dimensions of Bicameralism
Note: Dimensions based on Lijphart's (1999) measures of bicameralism.
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is a majority that is more than 50 percent of a voting population.2The more veto players in
a system, the greater the policy stability because it is more dicult to legislate changes to
the status quo. Veto points within a given government are determined by electoral results
and the rules of a constitution.
This paper is includes three parts and ve sections. It begins by discussing some features
of federalism and bicameralism, and how they might play the veto player role. The nature of
federalism, the federal state and bicameralism are then discussed in the context of existing
literature. Having established the peculiarities of federal institutions, a series of hypotheses
are presented that predict the role such institutions play in the production of new laws. I
then discuss the relevance of veto points generally to the nature of social policy, which is
the primary realm of signicant laws considered. Once the theoretical foundations are laid,
the variables and obersvations used in this study are discussed. An analytical section then
empirically demonstrates how federal institutions may have aected the production of two
dierent types of laws. It concludes with an overview of the shortcomings and limitations
of the methodolgical approaches used. Finally, the results are discussed in the context of
theoretical arguments made in this study and existing literature; a short conclusion poses
further questions and avenues for research.
2The European Union (EU), for instance, requires a qualied majority of 255 out of 345 votes representing
a majority of the EU states. Furthermore, legislation must represent a qualied majority of 62 percent of
the EU's population, if verication is requested by a member state. These qualied majority measures will
be altered to a double majority system in late 2014 under the Treaty of Lisbon.
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1 Veto Players and Federal Institutions
Tsebelis' 2002 book argues the institutional structure of federal states create more veto play-
ers. The two institutional structures, bicameralism and qualied majorities, mean that fed-
eral countries have ceteris paribus more veto players than unitary ones (2002, 136). However,
there are distinct dierences and implications between these two institutional structures. For
reasons that will be explained, I will concentrate on bicameralism. In addition to bicam-
eralism, I am arguing that the nature of the federal state in and of itself encourages vetos
and policy stability. Federalism has also been identied with strong courts and the power
of constitutional review to protect sub-national units from the federal government, while
ensuring supremacy of a constitution. However, again, I will focus here on bicameralism as
it is the means by which sub-national units are represented in the policy-making process
at a national level. The extent of the federal state likely aects the behavior of legislators,
elected by and for sub-national units, in a national legislature.
The upper chamber in bicameral legislatures or parliaments is purposed with the interests
of the minority and sober deliberation. This brings about a stable status quo when paired
with the capricion of the lower chamber. Meaning a new policy may not be legislated by
the majority, but rather by unanimous assent, as Madison says of the US Constitution in
Federalist Paper No. 39. Madison continues in Federalist No. 51:
Whilst all authority in it [the Constitution] will be derived from and dependent
on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests,
and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be
in little danger from interested combinations of the majority...This view of the
subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere
and considerate friends of republican government...
Yet, federal states have been created with dierent purposes. Learning from frailties of the
polarizing federalism in the US Constitution, revealed by the American Civil War, Canada
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was established as a more nuanced federal state by the British North America Acts,3 with
features that would not be quite so periperalising, particularlty as relates to the allocation
of functions among the governments and in the structure of the Senate (Riker, 1964: 116).
Put succinctly, bicameralism, particularly apportionment within chambers, is very impor-
tant: It creates conict and impedes the legislation of signicant new policies. Constitutional
architects may institute bicameralist structures to impede the will of a capricious majority,
protect interests of old elites or protect minority interests.
Lijphart (1999) uses the term strong bicameralism as a characteristic of consensus
democratic institituions, many scholars conate this with federalism.4 And rightly so, despite
a number of issues, as it seems the most appropriate measure of federalism in a national
legislature. Within the scope of this study, all federal countries also have bicameral national
legislatures. Bicameralism is appropriate to capture federalism because the interests of two
chambers, even if controlled by the same party, dier on a number of issues because of
dierent rules (Tsebelis & Money, 1997). The interests of each chamber are not a priori
congruent because constitutional veto players have independent power bases and sources of
legitimation (Roller, 2005: 90).
While it is quite easy to identify the source of policy stability in bicameral systems, i.e.,
that it is easier to pass a bill through one chamber than two, the source of stability in federal
states is not as clear. A federalism means there are sub-national units or constituent units
that compete with one another. Some prefer more centralization, while others prefer more
decentralization. When governing some will prefer policy A, others policy B. In the process of
democratic governance, these disagreements are settled through elections and governments,
and everyone cannot get their preferred policy (Arrow, 1950). However, if changing the
status quo is signicantly more dicult in systems with federal institutions, then the stakes
3As will be seen from other aspects of the Canadian government, the establishment of Canadian federalism
was signicantly inuenced by the fear of the français québécois of being a minority. This fear is often
assuaged by the adoption of federal consitutions; most recently seen in the new Iraqi government.
4Indeed, Lijphart notes that within his study of 36 democracies, all that boast federal systems have
bicameral legislatures. While even among unitary systems, about half are bicameralist. (1999: 203).
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for those participating in federal systems are much greater than unitary ones. If there is a
change you don't like, then just wait for the next election and reverse the change. However,
if multiple veto points in federal systems make reversing changes signicantly more dicult,
then there is much more to lose because it is unlikely such a change could be reversed in the
future. This dynamic, perhaps, encourages conict.
One might expect regional conict to be more dened in federal systems, perhaps be-
cause many federal systems were born out of regional mistrust and animosity. Because
constituent units have some degree of independence, there is much to lose by surrender-
ing powers to a federal government. Unless external conditions necessitate the surrender of
power, constituencies will vigorously defend their autonomy (Riker, 1964). This creates a
problem for both the principal and the agent. Constituencies could see very positive results
by surrendering some automony for a number of benets, but such benets, unless required
immediately due to external forces, would not be seen immediately. So even if surrendering
a few powers would create better outcomes, we shouldn't expect such decisions to be made
because short-term considerations will dominate (Kahneman & Tversky, 1970). The inherit
nature of federalism means that constituent units will end up advocating for their region's
(short-term) interests. Partisan loyalties strongly dictate preferences, but we should expect
regional loyalties to act similarly. For instance, members from opposite parties will likey
join together for or against legislation important to their region against members of opposite
parties from a dierent region (Krauss and Luke, 2004). A discussion about the nature of
Canadian and American federalism is presented later that will demonstrate how regional
preferences blocked the preferences of national majorities and altered resulting policy. In
both cases, there was regional-based policy preferences that aected the scope of national-
ized policy. This point will be further developed in following sections, but the important
takeaway is that federalist structures contribute to policy stability, i.e., a stable status quo.
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1.1 Policy Stability
The point of this study is to consider whether or not, and the degree to which, federalist
institutions contribute to policy stability. Policy stability is dened as the impossibility of
passing signicant new laws. For real world purposes, we could settle on policy stability
as being considered the very high probability that signicant new laws will not be passed.
Previous considerations have shown policy stability to be aected by a number of dier-
ent veto players (the dierent types of veto players will be discussed later). For instance,
proportional representation (PR) systems in which coalition governments are likely should
experience greater stability than majoritarian systems (Tsebeils, 1999). Presidential sys-
tems might also experience much less stability relative to parliamentary ones (Linz, 1994).
Systems with more veto players should also expect a more dicult time reforming budgets
(Tsebelis and Chang, 2004). The number of competitive parties in a given system is also a
good predictor of policy stability (Colomer, 2011).
Spacially, policy stability can be visualized as a circumstance in which there is a large
number of veto points with large distances between such points. The more veto points there
are and the greater the distance between the points, the less likely it is that common ground
will be found; if the actors in a given model's indierence curves do not overlap, then it is
likely the status quo will not be changed.
1.2 The Federal State
As discussed in the rst paragraph of the introduction, there are multiple denitions of fed-
eralism. Though these denitions consistently feature concpets of decentralization, seperate
levels of government and the role of geographically seperated units, there isn't necessarily a
universally accepted denition. The denitions provided by Riker and Elazar leave a lot of
room for interpretation, particularly as to what degree of power should be held by dierent
levels of government in order for it to be a federalism. Certainly some power in unitary
states will be delegated to locally elected ocials. However, this distinction isn't perfectly
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clear. Though political scientists have pretty good measures for determining if a country is
unitary or not. This study will utilize one such measure. This section will discuss iterations
and features of federalism. It takes a very loose denition of federalism to trace its history
and clearly present its features in the modern world.
1.2.1 Iterations of federalist structures through history
The earliest federalist looking structures seem to have come from the ancient Greeks following
their victory in the Peloponnesian War. This earliest iteration of federalism was, however,
a military arrangement more than our modern conception of a federal state. This federalist
arrangement failed quite dramatically as a result of the weak union amongst the constitutent
units that comprised the ancient Greek federation. The primary (if not only) purpose of the
federation was military in nature, so treaties, diplomatic matters, trade and civic aairs were
left up to each constituency. Riker (1964) says of this myopic arrangement:
As a consequence, the military function was ill-performed; the poor performance
was used by the rulers of constituent units as a justication for further restrictions
on the authority of federal military ocials; and such restrictions led in turn to
even worse military performance. First Macedon, then Rome, triumphed. And
the notion of federalism was not heard of again until the Middle Ages (8).
Those Middle Age iterations of federalism came from Northern Italian and Southern German
cities that united for common interests. Like the Greeks, these federations of medieval cities
joined together for a common defense from imperial states or empires. And again, like the
Greeks, these federations went through the same process that destroyed the Greek federation.
The lesson seems to be that too weak of a federation will likely result in its collapse. Like the
challenges that came from the weak arrangement created by the Articles of Confederation
in the years following the American Revolution, numerous federations or federal-looking
structures have failed throughout political history. Madison and his colleagues wrote the US
Constitution with the goal of strengthening the federation. He then joined Hamilton and Jay
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to write the Federalist Papers to sell the new federal arrangement to skeptical audiences tied
closely to their states. Fortunately for the US, Americans were able to ratify the Constitution
and create a stronger union of the states with the help of gures like Madison, Hamilton,
Jay and Washington. This made the United States the rst lasting federation and the oldest
in the world today. However, the oldest confederation comes from the Swiss.
Before going much further I'd like to quickly make the distinction between federations
and confederations. A federation is a group of constituent units unied by a federal, cen-
teral or national government. These units are bound together, generally, by a constitution,
but still maintain degrees of independence from each other and the centeral government.
A confederation is a looser agreement among sovereign constitutent units. These units are
generally considered more independent than those in federations. Confederations are also
considered more likely to be established by treaties, rather than the constitutions binding
a federation. Yet, there is still somewhat of a hazy middle ground for particular examples
that some might argue fall into a confederation and others into a federation. In this section,
these terms are used somewhat interchangeably to trace the origins and developments of the
overriding concepts that make modern federalism. Federation is often substituted for confed-
eration. Though these terms are conated in this short discussion, it should be remembered
that they are technically two seperate unions of constituent units.
1.2.2 The emergence of centeralized federalism
Before the establishment of the US, there were several previous iterations of federal-looking
political structures. The Dutch established a federation out of eorts to free Dutch elites from
imperial Spainish policies in the 16th Century. The Dutch federation was more centralized
than any previous federation, thus marking a signicant step forward for the consolidation
of a federal state (Riker, 1964). Though in practice the Dutch federation operated as a
monarchy for most of its existence, it did last more than 200 years.5 The US Constitution
5Late in the 18th Century Napolean ended the Dutch experiment in federalism.
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was in part modeled on the Dutch iteration of federalism. Madison touts the merits of this
confederacy of republics in Federalist No. 20. The US Declaration of Independence was also
analogous to the Act of Abjuration, or Plakkaat van Verlatinghe, which ended allegiancies
of Dutch magistrates to the Spanish Crown.
The lessons of Dutch and American federal iterations, especially when contrasted with
the other cases discussed, is that a more centeralized state is stronger and more durable than
a weaker confederation of constituent units. So federal structures are most likely to collapse
because of weak unions, which has often been the case because federal unions are created
based on the needs of self-intereted actors. Leaders have little reason to surrender powers to
a federal state or centeralized organization if it isn't in their self-interest to do so.
1.2.3 Why would a federation be established?
Whether it be the case of the Greeks, the Dutch or the Americans, federalist structures
generally arise as a result of necessity on behalf of the actors or constituencies involved.
Riker identies two conditions that create an atmosphere condusive to bargains establishing
federal arrangements among a group of actors. The rst is the expansion condition, which
comes from actors who want to expand their territorial control, but cannot pursue this goal
by conquest for whatever reason (weakness, military limitations, ideology, ect.). In order
to expand, oers or concessions must be made to the rulers of other constituent units the
actor wishes to control. Thus, a federal bargain is established. The second is the military
condition, which occurs when leaders strike a bargain to give up some degree of sovereignty
to a federation in order to achieve security from an external military-diplomatic threat or
realize gains from a potential opportunity (12). Meeting one of these two conditions are,
Riker says, always necessry to strike a federal bargain.
Among modern nation states, particularly developed democracies, there aren't any weak
confederations or federations like those of the ancient world or middle ages. One could
reasonably say the EU is a weak federation, but even the EU is integrated more than loose
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military structures like those of the Greeks or Northern Italians. If there is a threshold at
which point a centeralized federation is strong enough to last, only time will tell if the EU
has crossed it. Modern federal states that seem to be in precarious positions are only found
among newly created states. Iraq is the most unstable of the modern federal countries. It
was created to assuage the concerns of minority Shia and Kurdish regions, but it may result
in a collapsed state. Again, only time will tell if the Iraqi federation survives.
The important thing to remember is that too loose of a federation will collapse. Some
degree of centralization is required for a federation to survive. The mechanisms behind the
necessity of centralization for a federation's survival will be discussed later. For now, I leave
you with Riker:
In general the reason for the survival of centralized federalisms is the fact that
they are centralized; that rulers of the federation can overawe and overrule, but
not annihilate, the rulers of constituent units (50).
1.2.4 Federalism and the British Empire
Though there are competing versions of why this is the case, it happens to the the case that
a substantial number of former British colonies developed federal governments. The US,
Canada, Australia, India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Malaysia were each British colonies at one
point and eventually established federalist governments. New Zealand tried federalism, but
abolished it in 1876. There was also some discussion of creating a West Indian Federation
among British islands in the Caribbean, however this never came about. Riker would say
this is because there was no external military threat to these islands, so they had no need to
join a federation for common interests. Former British colonies in Southern Africa, Rhodesia
and Nyasaland also tried, but ultimately didn't succeed in building a federation. Among the
former British colonies federalist governments, for whatever reason, are quite common.
Some say this was a result of a divide to rule strategy pursued by British leaders and
bureaucrats. By dividing colonies up they could play them against each other to prevent
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united parties from rebelling against the Crown. Indeed, British politicians and pamphleteers
of the 18th Century cited the mistrust and competition among American colonies as a reason
they wouldn't unite and revolt, particularly during debate over what demands to make from
France during negotiations to end the Seven Years' War 6(Draper, 1996).
Another school of thought believes British federalisms were a result of practicality. It
suggests the British simply empowered royal governors over territories that were managable
enough for one man to control, and the size of these colonies wasn't big enough to establish a
nation state any way. By having colonies as seperate jurisdictions, they naturally developed
individual colonial interests. This view is taken by Riker, who says the British sought to
centralize by means of federalism (26). In any case, there is a curious draw to federal
systems among former British colonies.
1.2.5 Features of federalism
Some features of federal states have already been discussed: Bicameralism, qualied ma-
jorities and the power of judicial review. This section examines why federalism still exits
even after Riker's two conditions for creating a federation have disappeared and then con-
siders some of the theories of federalism. Particularly why there is no overarching theory
of federalism. It then further examines centralization and decentralization. Finally federal
institutions recieve an extended discussion.
The survival of a federal system is supposedly based on two primary factors. First,
centralization permits a national government to take advantage of a larger population and
territory for taxes and military purposes. This creates a more powerful entity in the national
government, which is thus better able to protect itself, project power and invest in the coun-
6British political thinkers debated whether the Empire should demand Canada or Caribbean sugar pro-
ducing islands from the French during treaty negotiations. One side saw more wealth and opportunity in
demanding the Caribbean, but were also concerned about the consequences of removing the French from
Canada. They warned that if the British controlled Canada, then the 'French threat' would no longer be
hanging over the heads of American colonists and they would no longer need the British for protection. Oth-
ers felt the American colonies were too divided to unite even if there was no 'French threat.' This side argued
the French should be kicked out of Canada to secure British interests on the North American continent.
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try. Second, maintaining established guarantees (through a constitution and constitutional
court with judicial review powers) to constituent units that they will not be subsumed by
a central government. If these guarantees are not present, then there is little to prevent a
central government from creating a unitary system. Though these factors seem to explain
some of federalisms survival, it still leaves much to be answered.
Considering the break down of areas of responsibility for dierent levels of government
is included in the administrative theory of federalism, which Riker shows doesn't apply
to the US; he does however nd that the structure of political parties is what encourages
or discourages the maintenance of the federal bargain (51). The administrative theory
considers a number of domains (money, borrowing, foreign aairs, trade, security, ect.), but
still falls short of an overarching theory of federalism. Another approach could be to simply
examine divisions of power in a constitution, but this is an ever changing feature of federalism
because it sits within the realm of lawyers and judges. There is also the transaction cost
theory of federalism that views federalist structures in a hierarchical principal-agent dynamic
(Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999). This problem is at the heart of federalist questions, but the
transaction cost theory still does not provide an overarching theory of federalism.
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) identify two essential dimensions to a federalist constitu-
tion, 1) local representation in a central government and 2) assignment of responsibilities,
and two essential objectives of a federalist constitution, 1) protecting rights and civic virture
and 2) economic eciency. However, this is incompatible. Achieving optimal representation
in local government may provide rights and civic virture, but impairs public sector economic
eciency. While poor local representation in central governmnt and clear assignment of re-
sponsibility will encourage eciency, it does not achieve protection of rights and civic virture.
Federalist constitutions must make hard choices and be responsive to the potentially chang-
ing economic and political conditions that lay behind these choices (Inman and Rubinfeld,
1997: 105). Unfortunately, the point of this study is to determine just how responsive and
capable of making hard choices federalisms are and, as it turns out, these systems are the
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opposite of responsive and seemingly incapable of making hard choices.
It is surprising that federalisms can last considering the great strains such systems ex-
perience. One of Riker's two conditions must be met for a federalism to form, and once
formed they must last. Some have and many haven't. Yet, there is no generally accepted
theory of federalism that explains why a federalism endures. So it seems that as Duchacek
(1987) sugggested, there is not any convincing theory of federalism. The political economy
of federalism, considered in the next section, provides some more insights but also yields
more questions.
1.2.6 Types of federalism
There have been a number of dierent types of federalism posited by political scientists,
economists and legal scholars. Such types could be considered dual federalism, cooperative
federalism, judicial federalism, scal federalism, market preserving federalism, and some have
even conated centralization or decentralization with a type of federalism (an erroneous
conation that will be sorted out later). Many of these types of federalism overlap or could
be subsumed within each other. Federalist literature, however, seems to focus primarily on
two types of clearly distinct federalisms: Market preserving federalism and scal federalism.
These are the two types discussed here.
Market preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995) is a weaker federalist union that features
sub-national units controlling the primary regulatory role in the economy; sub-national units
that do not inhibit trade with one another to ensure open commerce within a country; and
sub-national units that have hard budget constraints. This type of federalism features a
lot of sovereignty for sub-national governments and supposedly encourages good policies
because of competition. In this sense, sub-national units act similar to participants in a
market where competition will generate the best policies. This model of federalism works
under Tiebout's (1956) conditions that show mobility can create an ecient market for
public goods. Though signicant powers are delegated to sub-national governments in a
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market preserving federalism model, the national government should still control foreign
policy and the printing of money, which would also make borrowing money more dicult for
sub-national units. Thus, sub-national units have hard budget constraints. The relationship
between competition and hard budget constraints is central to this approach to federalism. It
is important under this type of federalism that government is strong enough to enforce laws
and protect property rights, but also to honor such roles without exerting 'overreaching'
governmental authority. A market preserving federalism was demonstrated by the early
American federal structure. Madison writes in Federalist No. 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government,
are few and dened. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indenite....The powers reserved to the several States will extend to
all the objects which, in the ordinary course of aairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, inprovement, and prosperity
of the State...The operations of the federal government will be most extensive
and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in
times of peace and security.
Weingast (1995) says a number of countries have demonstrated market preserving federal-
ism in practice though not necessarily in law. Weingast, Qian and Montinola (1995) suggest
that federalism, Chinese style, is at the root of China's economic success in recent decades.
They argue that political decentralization in China, mostly through giving local and provin-
cial governments the primary responsibility for economic matters within each jurisdiction,
created political durability within the Chinese system that in turn helped its robust econ-
omy through the 1990's. They say political durability is essential and results from political
decentralization. Central to the success of market preserving federalism is the element of
political durability built into arrangements, meaning that the decentralization of power is not
merely at the discretion of the central political authorities (53). In their article, Weingast,
Qian and Montinola identify ve conditions for an optimal market preserving federalism's
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institutional structure:
1. A hierarchy of governments with a delineated scope of authority exists so that each
government is autonomous within its own sphere of authority.
2. The sub-national governments have primary authority over the economy within their
jurisdictions.
3. The national government has the authority to police the common market and to ensure
the mobility of goods and factors across sub-government jurisdictions.
4. Revenue sharing among governments is limited and borrowing by governments is
constrained so that all governments face hard budget constraints.
5. The allocation of authority and responsibility has an institutionalized degree of dura-
bility so that it cannot be altered by the national government either unilaterally or under
the pressures from sub-national governments.
This is, more or less, a play o classical liberalism. So aspects of market preserving
federalism could be identied in both the early American republic and, as some have argued,
modern China (which is quite a comparison). To really examine this type of federalism,
one must look deeper than just decentralization. For instance, Argentina is a decentralized
government that gives spending authority to its provinces. Yet, the authority of taxation is
controlled by the central government and funds are transferred to the provinces. So provinces
are not necesarily subject to their own hard budget constraints. The Swiss have a somewhat
similar structure. There are signicant trasfers to states in the US as well. Two other cases
that feature signicant inter-governmental transfers to sub-national constituencies, which
are supposedly largely autonomous, are seen in Belgium and Australia. So while we might
be able to point to examples of market preserving federalism, an ideal case is dicult to
nd.
Additionally there are signicant problems with a market preserving federalist model.
To mention just one of these problems: Negative externalities create conict among sub-
national units and social, economic or environmental ills. Just ask a Chinese person living
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in Hebei Province: Is pollution from other provinces negatively aecting you? Problems
like this could supposedly be solved by cooperation among sub-national units, but that just
creates a prisoner's dilemma. This dilemma seems to be best solved with regulations from
a central government, which then means there is no longer market preserving federalism.
So market preserving federalism, particularly in democracies, seems a bit unsustainable.
That is, if citizens want minimal national standards within national markets. Another
problem with market preserving federalism is that it would likely stymie innovation because
innovation necessitates losses. This provides strong incentives to be laggards, especially if
those suering losses can vote with their wheel (Feigenbaum, Weaver and Samuels, 1993:
104). This problem has actually impeded more generous social policies in the US because
there is a high degree of mobility for both capital and labor (Robertson, 1989; Peterson and
Rom, 1990). Additionally, market preserving federalism does not seem applicable to any
country in this study. So another type of federalism may better explain the federalisms of
the modern era.
Fiscal federalism is another type of federalism that, rather than giving regions primary
economic power, gives federal funds to the constituent units to implement national or even
local programs. Funds would generally come through transfer payments or grants to regions
from the national government. A scal federalism approach concerns the distribution of
expenditure and revenue across dierent levels of government. This approach does not
necessarily consider sub-national units as the optimal level of government in which to vest
economic powers, but rather what powers should optimally belong to the dierent levels
of government. While market preserving federalism tends to be constitutionally ingrained,
scal federalism is signicantly more subject to partisan winds. One government may support
large grants for an important national program, while another may not pursue any national
programs. So the 'degree' of the state (regional and national) is more exible. In the US,
education would fall under a scal federalism denition.
Findings suggest there may be dierent roles for dierent aspects of government. Follow-
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ing in the steps of Richard Musgrave's (1959) Theory of Public Finance, dierent branches7
of public scal realms perform best when run by dierent levels of government (Oates, 1968).
The role of dierent levels of government should not be considered a static model, as times
change decentralization becomes more complex, governmental actors evolve and relation-
ships between levels of government evolve (Oates and Strassmann, 1978; Sharma, 1995). So
evolution among vertical levels of government occurs over time, making a federalism more
complex. Within federal states there is also evolution and learning horizontally between
localities or regions/provinces (Bouché and Volden, 2011). These evolutions could change
some people's denition of federalisms, but such evolutions should instead be considered as
developments in decentralization that create a more complex federalism.
There is a distinct dierence between the denitions of scal federalism, or any other
federalism for that matter, and decentralization (Sharma, 2005). The former should be
considered as ideas or conceptions, while the latter should be considered as the actual practice
or process of governance. There would inevitably have to be some degree of decentralization
in unitary as well as federal states. Because there is at least some decentralization in unitary
to federal states, it seems appropriate approach to try capturing the 'degree' of federalism
within a given country. This degree of federalism is generally measured through the practice
of decentralization. We may not be able to precisely dene federalisms, but we can broadly
consider decentralization. Therefore, decentralization is used in this study to operationalize
the idea of federalism.
1.2.7 (De)Centralization and capturing federalism
The concept of decentralization has been an extremely important aspect of federalism studies.
Some degree of centralization is required for a federal structure to survive, and some degree of
decentralization required for a unitary sturucture to operate. Decentralization, particularly
7Musgrave suggest three branches: stabilization, distribution and allocation. Oates suggests that the
rst two branches are best performed by the central government and the allocation branch is best for
local/regional, though in conjunction with the central government.
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within scal federalism literature, is the most debated aspect of federalism because it has
potential to both increase eciency and decrease transaction costs, while also creating a
host of problems. Whatever the ndings may suggest, decentralization is important and
ever changing because of the constellation of actors and forces driving the evolution of
decentralization.
Individual or collective actors have the potential to push decentralization in new direc-
tions. Actors at dierent levels of government should not just be considered benevolent
arbiters of government policy and resources. For instance, partisan actors (extremists vs.
centrists) develop preferences for more or less centralized federalisms (Cremer and Palfrey,
1999). Policy entrepreneurs can also have substantial impacts across sub-national units
(Mintrom, 1997). The point here is not to go into diusion literature or further examine
scal federalism, but to simply point out that decentralization is not static, is ever-evolving
and shapes the nature of each federalism.
If the power to tax at two or more levels of government is enough to consider just some
aspects of decentralization, then perhaps it should be considered on a scale of federalism.
Since federalism is a concept and decentralization a process, then degree of decentralization
seems the best measure of federalism. Figure II shows the 20 OECD countries considered
in this study, comparing their rank on a federalism index (Lijphart, 1999) with central
government tax revenues as a percentage of GDP in 2011. There is clearly a negative
correlation (-0.0033) between federalism and central government tax revenues. This means
that as the strength of federalism increases, central government tax revenues should be
expected to decrease. So what? Sure there is a negative correlation between federalism
and central government tax revenues, this could be because of economic conditions, varying
preferences for size of government or any number of other factors. To delve further into
understanding relationships between decentralization and federalism, it would be helpful to
examine dierent levels of government.
Figure III considers local plus regional tax revenues as a percentage of GDP against
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Figure II: Federalism Index and Central Government Tax Revenue as a % of GDP in 2011
the federalism index in 2011 for 20 countries. Again, results seem to support the idea that
greater decentralization means greater federalism; more to the point, that the federalism
index is a valid measure of federalism. While strong federal countries (considered a 5 in
the index) see much more regional and local tax revenues relative to GDP, weaker federal or
unitary countries (a 1 in the index) see much less revenues for their respective sub-national
units. The correlation (0.11) in Figure III is stronger than in Figure II, suggesting stronger
federal countries would see much more authority and power in the hands of dierent levels of
government. In both gures, there is one strong federal country that seems to be an outlier,
taking in much more central government tax revenue and much less state and local revenue
than the other strong federal countries. That outlier is Australia. This could be because
of peculiarities in Australia's scal federalism and welfare regime. Legal constraints and
Australian history developed a centralization of revenue functions and an ever-increasing
nancial dependence of the states on the central government...[that] emphasizes uniformity
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Figure III: Federalism Index and Regional + Local Tax Revenues as a % of GDP in 2011
of public services across the nation and uses conditional grants to achieve that purpose
(Spahn and Shah, 1996). So there is clearly a very important role for Australian states,
as they implement national programs. There are signicant transfer payments between the
central government and the states, but the states and localities take in less revenue and the
central government takes in more as a result of centralized revenue functions. I don't think
this necessarily means that Australia is any less federal than, say Switzerland or the US,
because its states still maintain signicant responsibilities.
The other two outliers in Figure III are Sweden, a fairly weak federal state (a 2 on
the federalism index), and Canada, which both allocate more than 15 percent of GDP to
local and/or regional governments. Canada shouldn't be surprising because it is considered
strongly federal, so signicant tax revenues would be expected to go towards local and
provincial governments. Sweden, however, is quite a bit more surprising based on its score
in the federalism index. Levin (2009) believes this is because of Sweden's decentralization
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that is, interestingly, derived from what is generally considered a unitary state:
Sweden is a unitary state and all power ultimately emanates from the national
legislature. However, this legislature  the Riksdag  has delegated more exten-
sive powers to the regional-level county councils and the local-level municipalities
(both of which are technically so-called communes) than is common in other
unitary states (Wetterberg 2004). The autonomy of the communes, which dates
back to the early 1800s, is since 1975 guaranteed in the constitution and is further
strengthened by the fact that regional and local level representatives are directly
elected. Two additional sources of local/regional autonomy are the division of
competences and their right to levy taxes (43).
The Rikstag is unicameral so it would not demonstrate any of the federalist apects of bi-
cameralism that will be discussed in the following pages. There is no federalist character to
the Rikstag that is witnessed in other legislatures in federal countries. This case may reveal
some weaknesses to the federalism index, but because of its political make-up Sweden simply
cannot be considered a federal state. Therefore, the federalism index considers Sweden a
weak federal state. Based soley on Sweden's decentralization of taxation, some readers would
likely argue it should be considered stronger than a two on the federalism index, but few
would argue it to be a four or ve. So Sweden shows the strengths (a more delicate measure
of federal than a simple federal-unitary dicotomy) and weaknesses (it cannot consider all as-
pects of federalism) of this index8. In any case, these examples should show the complexities
of federalism, but also demonstrate the general strengths of the federalism index in capturing
the practice of decentralization (and thus the idea of federalism).
8See Lijphart (1999, 193) for a dierent look at the federalism index and decentralized taxation. The
same conclusions would be drawn from this gure as are drawn here.
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1.3 Bicameralism
The early structure of upper chambers was rarely democratic. These chambers were often
based on heredity, such as the UK's House of Lords, or social entitlements and meant to
act as a conservative break on the more democratically elected lower chambers (Lijphart,
1999: 203). Aristocratic arrangements resulted in bicameral looking structures. These ar-
rangements were generally created to represent dierent estates within a given territory.
For instance, in France the Estates-General comprised three estates for clergy, nobles and
commoners. Though hardly a serious political force9 or even representative of the French
people, this body represents a precursor to modern bicameralism. Other bodies of estates
were seen in the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Russia (meaning its formerly autonomous
territory of Finland). As aristocracy and feudalism faded, new bodies were created, some-
times reinventing the old estates. The UK's House of Lords is based on Lords Spiritual
and Temporal; even today the UK's upper chamber is composed of archbishops, bishops,
earls and various types of lords. The bodies precursing modern bicameralism were meant to
distribute some powers to landed, noble or clerical elites and away from monarchies. In the
19th Centrury a number of more modern, though hardly democratic bodies, were established
to continue providing political representation/power to elites. The French Chamber of Peers
would be one such example. Another would be an early version of the Italian Senate that
began in 1848; its members were appointed by the king. Following World War II, the mod-
ern Italian parliament was formed with a similar upper chamber, albeit a more democratic
one. For many countries, vestiges of aristocratic upper chambers inuenced the parliamen-
tary structure and constitution of today's European democratic states (Lodici, 2002). The
important take away is that upper chambers were meant to serve as not only conservative
brakes, but to establish an arrangement that favored elites.
This arrangement slowly ended as universal enfranchisement took hold among democratic
9The Estates-General didn't even meet between 1614 and 1789, and when it nally met the result was
commoners creating a National Assembly. This event might be better known as precipitating the French
Revolution.
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states. The elites of the old guard, however, opted to inuence the institutional structure
of the new government to maximize their inuence within the new status quo (Boix, 1999).
Some upper houses became largely ceremonial over time, but many upper houses maintained
constitutional relevance after universal surage. The basic functions of the US Senate re-
mained even after the 17th Amendment established popular elections for Senators, while
the Australian Senate was reformed in 1948 to establish proportional representation. These
reforms no doubt changed the 'type' of politicians elected, but the constitutional powers of
the bodies remained largely the same. And though aspects of upper houses have changed,
its function as a brake on the will of the lower house has remained in many governments.
This brake promotes policy stability, often to the frustration of the lower or people's
house. If a second chamber dissents from the rst, it is mischievous; if it agrees it is
superuous, says 18 century political philosopher Abbé de Sieyès. This statement remains
insightful as the diusion of powers between chambers eects the process of governence and
therefore political behavior. Bicameralism eects the process of legislating, thus inuencing
the actors, institutions and processes surrounding the legislation of new policy.
Bicameralism should shape party behaviors since, under a strong bicameralism theory,
one chamber will have veto power over another. Regardless of partisan congruence between
chambers, members of each chamber still have unique institutional interests (Tsebelis &
Money, 1997). This means legislators act to further their partisan interests, while also pro-
tecting their chambers' constitutional powers. So even though concurrent majorities would
make it easier to pass laws, there are still institutional barriers to easy legislation. Such an
arrangement should intuitively tell us that bicameral systems would feature greater policy
stability than unicameral systems. Though bicameralism doesn't eect government forma-
tion, it does eect government duration, so governments with upper-chamber majorities
last substantially longer than those without (Druckman & Thies, 2002: 760). Bicameralism
(and federalism) may also eect the quality of policy outputs from governments (Lijphart,
1999). Thus arises the question of how exactly to conceptualize and measure bicameralism.
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The closest we can come to answering, and the method which I will apply, is to compile
some of the features of bicamerlism discussed over the following pages into a two-dimensional
measure of bicameralism. The rst dimension is based on an asymmetrical-to-symmetrical
space, which comprises the constitutional powers and democratic legitimacy of an upper
chamber. The second dimension is on a congruent-to-incongruent space, which operational-
izes malapportionment. Taken together, both dimensions can provide us with a useful means
of considering multiple aspects of bicameralism, while also measuring the veto power of bi-
cameral institutions. These dimensions can be seen in Figure 1.
This conceptualization allows us to understand the scope of bicameralism across govern-
ments. Particularly, it will allow a reasonable comparison of the signicance of bicameralism
between federal and unitary states. Since I join others who conate federal states and bicam-
eralism, this concepualization allows us to see where each state falls on a federal-bicameral
space (see Figure IV) and predict which would feature more veto points. To summarize,
this seems the best way to capture the complexities of bicameralism and compare across
countries.
1.3.1 Dierences between chambers in a bicameral system
There are several dierences between lower and upper chambers. First, legislators in an
upper chamber could often expect to have longer terms than their colleagues in the lower
chamber. Some members of upper chambers can hold lifelong terms, such as the House of
Lords or the Canadian Senate.10 Though some systems feature upper chamber terms that
are equal to the lower, most hold a longer term of oce. Longer term lengths are supposed to
make upper chamber members more thoughtful when debating legislation becasue re-election
is not as temporally worrisome as to those in a lower chamber. Second, the upper chamber
is nearly always smaller than the lower. The ratio between two chambers varies among
bicameral systems. For instance, the new German Bundestag (lower chamber) has 631 seats,
10Today Canadian Senators may serve until age 75, whereas before reforms in the 1960's they served for
life.
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while the Bundesrat (upper chamber) has 69 seats. Most bicameral legislatures feature a
smaller disparity between chambers, but the upper is essentially always smaller.11 The US
features a smaller ratio between chambers than Germany; the US Senate has 100 members,
while the US House of Representatives has 435. Third, unlike most lower chambers, most
upper chamber members are not subject to re-election each election day, meaning there is less
turnover following each election. For instance, while the entire US House of Representatives
must stand for election in each cycle (every two years), only about one-third of the Senate is
subject to re-election. Likewise, half of the the French Sénat is elected every three years with
members holding six year terms. The Australian Senate could, in theory, also see turnover
of half the body each election, its members serve six-year terms and half of the Senate faces
election every three years. Members of the Swiss Council of States, however, must stand for
election each cycle. Meaning, in theory, the membership of the entire chamber could turnover
following an election. So upper chamber turnover each election may be up to one-third of
members in the US and one-half in France and Australia, while all upper chamber members in
Switzerland could turnover. Terms and turnover vary, but upper chamber members accross
bicameral systems generally hold their seat longer than their counterparts in lower chambers,
and upper chamber membership is more stable.
Finally, (mal)apportionment within an upper chamber can play a very important role
in both the makeup of citizen representation and federalist characteristics. Malapportion-
ment is the degree of unequitable representation of citizens in a legislature. For example,
based on 2010 reports from the US Census, California had a population of more than 37.2
million and Wymoming less than 600,000, yet both states send two senators to represent
them in the Senate. Put simply, this means each Wyoming voter has more than sixty-four
times the inuence over Senate business than do California voters. Germany also features
malapportionment, but to a signicantly smaller degree than the US. Also, like in the US,
11I say essentially smaller because the one exception I'm aware of is the UK Parliament. The House of
Lords currently has 785 members and the House of Commons had 650 after the 2010 election. In any case,
virtually all power in the Westminster system is held by the lower chamber.
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seats in the Bundesrat are meant to represent the interests of each state. Each German
Länder (state) recieves between three and six seats, with more seats going to those with
greater populations. Take just one example, malapportionment in the Bundesrat ranges
from one vote for every 182,000 citizens in Bremen to one vote for every 3 million citizens
in North Rine-Westphalia (Conradt & Langenbacher, 2013). Borrowed from the American
system, the Australian system also features a xed number of Senators from each state
that results in signicant malapportionment.12 Canada would also be considered malappor-
tioned because its Senators, which are recommended by political parties then nominated by
the Prime Minister and appointed by the Governor General, come from the Provinces and
are not equally apportioned. There are between one and six Canadian Senators from each
Province or territory. Apportionment is important, and greater malapportionment results in
a more federalist character within a national legislature. Indeed, all strong federal countries
in this study feature fairly signicant degrees of malapportionment.
It may be helpful to consider this concept on a general level. Systems are either perfectly
apportioned or malapportioned; a perfectly-apportioned system would mean that no voters'
ballot is weighted dierently than another's (Samuel & Snyder, 2001). Malapportionment,
in terms of Dahl's (2003) 'one person, one vote' denition of democracy, would create un-
democratic outcomes. Though it may assuage the (often very real) concerns of a minority.
Whatever democratic theorists think about this concept, it has very real implications for
policy making (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1988).
For the purposes of this study, I am suggesting that malapportionment acts as a kind of
veto point because it lends a minority disproportionate inuence over outcomes. Snyder and
Samuel's 2001 article laid out a method to measure malapportionment in both lower and
upper chambers. They found upper chambers to be much more malapportioned than their
counterparts. Based on their calculations of upper chamber malapportionment (662), the US
12The xed number rule has an exception for two Australian territories that send two senators each, instead
of the six elected by each state.
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Table I: Upper Chamber Features in Strong Federal States
Legend: PR=Proportional Representation; FPTP=First-past-the-post
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union website and Obinger, Liebfried and Castles (2005).
*The four senators from the two Australian territories serve only three year terms.
**Election methods, like in the US, are left up to each Swiss Canton. All but one uses FPTP; the
Canton of Jura uses PR.
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is the most malapportioned system among the countries considered in this study.13 Switzer-
land is the next most malapportioned, followed by Australia, Germany, Japan, Austria and
Italy. Each of these countries features moderate to strong bicameralism or federalism (see
Figure V for bicameral-federal strength). Figure IV shows the relationship between eight
countries with malapportionment measurements and new social security laws passed between
1980 and 2011. There is a slight correlation (-0.2485) between stronger malapportionment
and passing fewer new laws. Though this hardly presents convincing enough evidence to say
malapportionment will inhibit the passage of new laws, it does present some evidence sug-
gesting malapportionment might matter. This particular question (does malapportionment
inhibit the production of new laws?) is best left for another study. For present purposes,
however, I felt it best to show the relationship between malapportionment and new laws.
We do know that malapportionment matters in terms of legislative composition, so it is a
reasonable aspect of bicameralism to include in measurements of bicameral strength. Partic-
ularly because malapportionment has the potential to make a minority population far more
inuential than its share of a total population would suggest.
Malapportionment, at least within the scope of this study, is a consistent feature in
strong bicameral and federal systems. Such a feature likely feeds conict across cleavages
(ideological, rural-urban, religious, ethnic, regional, re-distribution preferences, ect.) and,
thus, encourages vetos. This is why Figure I claims that the top right of the two dimensions
of bicameralism is where the most veto players lie: Where there is both incongruency and
symmetry. If a minority is making a demand, which must be considered by the majority,
it has the ability to inhibit or prohibit the preferred policy of the majority.14 Otherwise a
majority could simply enact its preference without the approval of the minority. So, I would
13Among the countries considered in Samuel and Snyder's calculations the US ranked fth. The more
malapportioned upper chambers were in 4) the Dominican Republic, 3) Bolivia, 2) Brazil and 1) Argentina.
14The aspect of federalism not considered here, but is very important, is that of qualied majorities.
Should a chamber have qualied majority rules, the minority role in the legislating process would likely be
even greater. Though qualied majorities are not drawn into this study, its importance should not be left
unconsidered. It would very likely add greater veto possibilities to an upper chamer and further promote
policy stability.
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Figure IV: New Social Security Laws Passed (1980-2011) and Upper Chamber Malappor-
tionment
suggest, malapportionment has the potential to act as a type of veto player.
1.3.2 Dierences across upper chambers in bicameral systems
To recap: Upper chambers dier over terms, size, post-election turnover and apportionment.
Yet, the points I wish to make here concern how an individual is elected or appointed to
a seat. Malapportionment may create undemocratic outcomes, but so does the method
by which upper chamber members come to hold a seat. These methods will eect the
democratic legitimacy of the upper chamber, which sometimes can impede its constitutional
powers. Constitutionally, Canada has symmetry between its two chambers and, in theory,
both chambers hold vetos over new laws. But its Senate is weaker in practice because it has
little, if any, democratic legitimacy.
So democratic legitimacy is another key feature of bicameralism. The key features of
bicameralism are presented in Table I for each of the ve strong federal states in this study;
Canada is a strong federal state but considered only a moderate bicameral state because of
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its democratic illegitimacy.15
Many though not all upper houses rely on methods of appointing or electing members
without direct democratic elections. Germany, France, Ireland, Canada and the UK each
feature variations on non-direct elections or appointment to ll the upper chamber.16 Each
state government in Germany appoints, and may recall, its representatives to the Bun-
desrat.17 France's Sénat is elected by grands électeurs, which are a collection of city or
regional councilors, mayors, members of the National Assembly and other elites. Ireland has
perhaps themost peculiar method. The Irish Oireachtas Éireann, or 'national parliament',
is composed of a lower and more powerful chamber, Dáil Éireann, and a less powerful upper
chamber, Seanad Éireann. The Seanad, or Senate, is composed of members appointed by a
variety of elites: Some are appointed by the prime minister, others elected by graduates of
certain Irish universities, and others by political elites18 sitting on special committees. The
Irish Seanad and British House of Lords (and the Canadian Senate to a certain extent) are
vestiges of aristocracy, but hold signicantly less powers than their respective lower cham-
bers. Meanwhile, upper chambers like the US Senate, Australian Senate or Swiss Council of
States are comprised of members directly elected to chambers with signicant constitutional
powers. These systems are a minority among the countries considered here, but quite impor-
tant given the signicant scope of constitutional powers they allocate to both chambers of a
legislature. In all, relatively few countries t neatly into the federal-unitary or unicameral-
bicameral boxes, though most fall predictably in the middle. There are, however, several
interesting cases in this middle ground.
15The Canadian Senate used to hold more power than it does today.
16These methods were generally inherited from pre-democratic systems of the 17th and 18th century.
17These representatives are very constrained. Not only do they answer to state governments, but all
members from each state must vote en bloc. The principle of this is that members are supposed to represent
their state.
18Such as members of the lower house, senators and local ocials.
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1.3.3 Interesting cases: Austria, Belgium, Italy and Japan
Before moving on to the next section, it seems important to discuss a few interesting cases
that do not t squarely in the unicameral-bicameral and unitary-federal realms. Meaning a
strong bicameral and federal state or a unitary and unicameral state. Austria and Belgium
are each a bit peculiar. Austria is quite a strong federal state (4.5/5 on the federalism
index), but a weak bicameral system. Belgium is similarly a relatively strong federal state
(4.2/5), but also bicamerally weak. Meanwhile, Italy and Japan are peculiar in the opposite
direction. Italy is a moderately strong bicameral system that is quite weak federally. And
Japan is also a moderately strong bicameral system with a weak federal state.
Austria and Belgium are each comparatively strong federal states that do not provide
signicant national representation, in the form of bicameralism, to their respective regions.
The Austrian constitution is set up as a federalist system that distributes powers between the
various Länder and the central government. The Austrian Länder do have some signicant
powers over their own aairs, for example policing, implementing programs or even making
treaties with one another, but signicant powers also reside in the central government. The
central government, somewhat like Australia, delegates a lot of duties to the Länder. Take,
for instance, the distribution of tax revenue between levels of government. The localities
and Länder have very little direct tax revenue (2.1 percent of GDP), while the central
government has quite a bit (28.1 percent). It is through transfer payments that these sub-
national constituencies get most of their resources to pursue various policies. This type of
federalism, as has been shown, is not unheard of, but the lack of substantive representation
for the Länder in the national government is. Unlike most other strong federal countries the
Austrian upper chamber, the Federal Council or Bundesrat, has very little real power. Yes,
you might say, but so does the Canadian Senate. The dierence is that the Canadian Senate
has real constitutional powers that do not always exist in practice. The Austrian Federal
Council, however, has little real constitutional power. While technically the Canadian Senate
and other upper chambers in strong federal countries have veto powers, those of the Federal
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Council are irrelevant and in practice essentially non-existent. It has a suspensive veto and
has to approve laws passed by the more powerful lower house, the National Council, though
it can be overridden by a simple majority of the lower house. Thus the veto is rarely (if ever)
exercised. The Federal Council represents the nine Länder as one might expect of upper
chamers in federal states and is elected by Länder governments, much like in Germany.
Belgium is a federal state, composed of communities and regions, states the rst article
of Belgium's constitution. It's constitution began reforming towards a federal state in 1970,
and on the federalism index is considered a 4.2 out of 5. So it is a pretty strong federal state.
There are three communities in Belgium: The Flemish Community, the French Community
and the German-speaking Community. These communities are divided along cultural and
language lines. The three regions referred to in the constitution fall along similar lines as
communities, but were made to increase regional economic autonomy. The regions are the
Flemish Region, the Brussels-Capital Region and the Walloon Region. In practice, these
regions would be analogous to states or Canadian provinces. In addition, Belgium is divided
into 589 municipalities and 10 provinces. The central Belgian government has signicant
powers in foreign relations, welfare, justice, nance and some aspects of health care and
domestic policy, while its three regions hold various economic powers relating to employment,
agriculture, water use, housing, public works, the environment and energy, just to name a
few. While communities hold competences in social services, health policy and immigration
services. Many of the powers held by communities and regions are also held by provinces
and communies (municipalities), such as public works, welfare, housing and education. The
point of Belgium's constitutional reforms in the late 20th Century were to bring the decision-
making process closer to citizens. Tax revenue is primarily directed towards the central
government; the various constituent units received about 4.5 percent of GDP in tax revenues,
less than average among the 20 countries considered, but more than the stronger federal
state of Austria. However, spending in Belgium's constituent units is quite high relative
to tax revenue. Leibfritz (2009) found the Belgian vertical scal gap (VFG), which is total
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local/regional spending minus share of revenues, to be larger than that of Australia, Austria,
Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the US in 2006. That year the local/regional
governments share of spending was about 24 percent and its share of tax revenue about
9 percent, giving Belgium a VFG of 15. This is quite high, so though Belgium's regions,
communities, provinces and communes have quite a bit of power, the ability to carry out
their respective programs is largely dependent upon transfers from the central government.
Still, this is a strongly federalist characteristic and Belgium's large VFG demonstrates the
importance of federalism in Belgian society. Belgium's Federal Parliament is a moderately
strong bicameral system. The Chamber of Representatives (the lower chamber) is much
stronger than the Senate (upper chamber) following constitutional reforms. In some domains
the Senate has equal power, such as in approving treaties, constitutional amendments and
laws aecting lower levels of government, but for most other matters the lower chamber can
do as it likes. This makes Belgium an asymmetrical bicameral system. Members of the
Belgian Senate get to the chamber through a combination of PR elections, appointments
from Community parliaments and other means. So though Belgiums upper chamber has
federalist characteristics, in that some member represent the interests of their communities,
it has few powers.
While Belgium and Austria are strong federal states with weak bicameral systems, Italy is
a weak federal state with a comparatively strong bicameral system. Its Senate or Senato della
Repubblica (upper chamber) consists of 315 members, most of whom are elected for ve-year
terms by regions in Italy.19 Senators are elected through both PR and FPTP, depending on
the seat they hold. What makes Italy peculiar is that it's a weak federal state, but it's upper
chamber (mostly made up of members representing regional interests) has powers symmetric
with the lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies. Both the Italian Senate and Chamber of
Deputies may propose new legislation, amend legislation, create committees to investigate
public malfeasance, declare war, and appoint some judges and public ocials. So Italy has
19There are a small number of senators for life, generally famous or accomplished Italians, and members
representing Italian citizens living out-of-country.
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a federal legislature, but not a federal state. This dynamic adds veto players in the sense
of federalist representation in parliament, but not in the sense of a federal state. This is
strange among the countries considered here. Japan features a similarly strange system.
The Japanese legislature, and for that matter the wider Japanese government, was largely
inuenced by the US following World War II. For instance, it has three branches of govern-
ment like in the US. The National Diet, the national legislature, is composed of a Houes of
Representatives (lower chamber) and a House of Councillors (upper chamber). The House
of Councillors looks much like the US Senate in that it has members serving six-year terms.
Half of members are subject to re-election at each election. Some members are elected by
Japanese districts through single non-transferable vote and others through a national PR
ballot. However, the Japanese upper chamber is not nearly as powerful as the US Sen-
ate. The Japanese upper house is also less powerful than its counterpart in most matters.
Though it has power to veto certain legislation, the veto can be overridden with a two-thirds
qualied majority in the lower house. Additionally, the House of Councillors has no powers
over certain legislation, such as approval of treaties or some budget issues. So though the
House of Councillors has much more power than the UK's House of Lords or Irish Seanad
Éireann, it does not have powers symmetric with its counterpart, the House of Represen-
tatives. The Japanese upper chamber is more malapportioned than Italy, Austria or the
Netherlands (Samuels and Snyder, 2001). So it meets two of the three qualications for a
strong bicameral system. It comes up a bit short of a strong bicameral system because the
House of Councillors, despite having some substantial constitutional powers, is less powerful
than the lower chamber. Still, along with Italy, the Japanese upper chamber is rare in that
it has democratic legitimacy, a degree of constitutional powers and malapportionment, yet
it does not act within the context of a federal state.
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1.4 Other Veto Players
Federalism, and by extension bicameralism, is just one type of veto player that can aect the
legislation process. There are individual and collective veto players; institutional and parti-
san; presidential and parliamentary; executive and legislative; bureaucracies and judiciaries;
referendums and likely others as well. Several of the more important veto players will be
discussed in this section, which is not to suggest that the others are irrelevant in any way.
Veto players can be institutional, if they are generated by the constitution. And they can
be partisan, if they are created by political games. So if we were to take one of the strong
federal-bicameral states considered, say Switzerland, then we could identify both institutional
and partisan veto players. A new law must be approved by both chambers of the Federal
Assembly of Switzerland, which Tsebeils would consider two institutional veto players. A
new law, however, must also be approved by the coalition of parties controlling the chambers,
which creates partisan veto players. These are the two general types of veto players, but
numerous other actors could be considered to sit within the umbrellas of institutional or
partisan veto points.
The perfect example of the individual veto player is the US President, whose approval
must be granted to make a new law (except in the exceedingly rare instance of a congres-
sional override of an executive veto). While the US President is an individual veto player,
the US Congress is a collective veto player. Individual veto players are quite rarer than col-
lective players in modern democracies. Other examples of collective veto players could be a
committee, political party, a parliament/legislature or even a referendum. The consideration
of collective veto players in a spatial approach is quite complicated,20 but it can be simpli-
ed (very simplied!) to majority rule amongst a collection of individual actors. Though
clearly this is not how all collective actors work. Qualied majorities, for instance, do not
operate under majority rules of a collective actor. Agenda setters are important inuencers
of outcomes (Tsebelis, 2002; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997; Riker, 1982), so the nature of a
20See Tsebelis (2002) Chapter 2 for a discussion of this complex veto player (20-38).
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particular political system also aects the inuence of veto players and outcomes.
Agenda setting power may be the most important dierence between presidential and
parliamentary democracies. The agenda will belong to the governing party or coalition in
parliamentary systems and to the legislatures in presidential systems. It is theoretically
possible that both of these systems would have one veto player and one agenda setter (and
it is relatively simple to identify the single agenda setter and veto player in an authoritar-
ian system: The autocrat!). Within parliamentary systems, numerous complications arise
when considering coalition governments, the complications are more severe in large coalitions
than minimum-winning coalitions or minority governments. The primary dierence between
democratic systems is agenda setting powers, though there is often a dierence in the number
of veto players as well. There are other veto players, many of which were mentioned earlier
in this section, but the most important ones for understanding variation in the production
of new laws across and within systems have been discussed here.
1.5 Hypotheses
I posit several hypotheses concerning the salience of veto players theory to federalism. The
chief question is if federal states do indeed produce fewer signicant new laws than unitary
ones? So,
H1: Federal states will prodcue fewer signicant new laws than unitary states
because federal institutions will aect the behavior of individual actors within a
legislature or parliament.
This hypothesis might intutitively imply part of my second research question: Do states
with stronger bicameralism produce fewer signicant new laws than weaker bicameral or
unicameral states? Since every strong federal state in the universe of this study features
bicameral legislatures, one might expect bicameralism to demonstrate similar tendencies. So
the second hypothesis is,
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H2: Strong bicameral states will produce fewer signicant new laws than weaker
bicameral or unicameral states because chambers act as veto players on one
another and, thus, aect the behavior of individual actors within a legislature or
parliament.
If strong federal and bicameral states produce fewer signicant new laws than unitary and
unicameral states, then one could also believe that taken together strong federal-bicameral
states will produce the fewest laws. If this is the case, then strong unitary-unicameral states
should produce the most signicant new laws. Which leads to the third hypothesis,
H3: Stong federal-bicameral states will produce fewer signicant new laws than
weak federal-bicameral (or unitary-unicameral) states because both federal states
and bicameralism act as vetos on new legislation.
I would suggest that federalism acts as a veto player because it positions sub-national enti-
ties against each other, making them compete against each other. And positions chambers
in a national legislature or paliament against each other, as well as creates conict within
chambers (particularly the upper chamber) based on regionalism. Regionalism might aect
legislators' behavior, making him or her less likely to compromise or acquiesce to another
region's wants, beliefs or interests. Social institutions aect individual behavior, thus strate-
gic decision making inuences social outcomes (Knight, 1992). For instance, the American
South often sends legislators to Washington that prevent the enactment of policies preferred
by the vast majority of the country. This was seen during the New Deal, Civil Rights era
and, perhaps, today as well.
Meanwhile, bicameralism positions two chambers to compete with each other. If one
chamber is held by a dierent party than another, then stability (no policy changes to the
status quo) is likely to continue. Though even if chambers are held by the same party, then
the two chambers will still compete for power and defend their respective institutional turfs;
meaning each chamber will have dierent preferences. Again, this means policy stability
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is likely to continue. If the disparate beliefs and preferences of various sub-national units
are represented, malapportionately, within a strong upper chamber, then I believe this will
compound the problem of producing new laws. So taken together, strong bicameralism and
federalism will produce the fewest signicant new laws, because each will generate more veto
points. Whether these points are rule (constitutionally) based, as with bicameralism, or
based on the disparate beliefs and preferences of legislators (partisan) within a federal state.
1.6 Veto Points and Social Policy
The development of social policy is a circumstance in which a welfare state increasingly
develops under blurred risk (Gaullier 1992: 23-45; Guillemard 1993a: 266; Mares, 2003).
Policy makers involved in passing social welfare laws generally don't know exactly how these
programs will eect markets and scal sustainability in decades ahead. Additionally, it is
perhaps the most dicult outlay of a government's budget to amend given the immense
social impact, economic consequences and political ramications of fudgeting with citizen's
benets.21 More broadly, cuts to these types of programs (health care, old-age incomes,
ect.) are quite unpopular and politically dicult. Former German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder made important, but politically dicult, reforms to the German labor market
during his tenure from the late 1990's to the mid 2000's. These reforms brought Chancellor
Angela Merkel to power and politically injured Schröder and his SDP party. Welfare reforms
are possible and most likely electorally unpopular, but wile politicos, such as Reagan and
Thatcher, will obfuscate such cuts to welfare programs (Pierson, 1994). Aside from the
fortunes of politicians, we should generally expect that systems with a greater number of veto
players - such as bicameralist systems, those with coalition government, or executive-level
veto powers - will have a much more dicult time changing the structure of their budgets
(Tsebelis, 1999; Tsebelis and Chang, 2004).
21In the US, even among self-identied (and supposedly anti-government handout) Tea Party supporters
there was 76 percent opposition to signicant reforms to Medicare or Social Security, according to a 2011
poll by the McClatchy-Marist Institute for Public Opinion. 81 percent of all voters opposed such reforms.
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Though before reforms can be made, laws must rst be legislated and implemented.
The benets provided by social policies were often excpetionally dicult to legislate and
implement, given the dynamics of business interests, union interests and state interests that
might have to consent to an agreeable new policy (Mares, 2003; 2006). The range of actors
eected by new social policies make the legislation process quite arduous and, thus, a great
test of veto players theory. There should be consistent conicts between legislator's beliefs
and preferences about the role of the state and the market. Parties are generally considered
to be divided on a single dimension of economic preferences: More state versus more market.
Therefore, I use new social security laws as the very signicant law that is tested against
federal and bicameral institutions because it represents a perennially important ideological
cleavage that is quite dicult to legislate.
Federalism matters for the development of the welfare state's social policy (Pierson,
1995). While institutional veto players, such as bicameral or federal structures, have sig-
nicant eects on the ease or likelihood of changes to the status quo, there are a number
of wider implications. Immergut's (1992) veto player analysis of health policy legislation
in three European countries demonstrates how institutional veto points play a signicant
role in structuring political conict and policy outcomes. Two opposing actors will nd a
compromise acceptable, agreeing on second best policy options because of a fear that an
uncompromising militancy or obstinate veto could result in an even less desirable outcome
(Mares, 2000). So social policies may be based on what could be legislated rather than what
should be legislated. Which leads us back to Immergut's study and the importance of insti-
tutions in explaining policy outcomes precisely because they facilitate or impede the entry
of dierent groups into the policy-making process (xii). So institutions can create vetos and
distort policy outcomes, while the decentralized nature of fedrealism can also aect policies
across a country's constituent units.
The nature of federalist systems can diminish the generosity of welfare by creating a
race to the bottom amongst the competing constituencies witin a country. Under these
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circumstances, competitive federalism is likely to mean competitive deregulation, which en-
courages sub-national actors to widen the scope of the market (Pierson, 1995: 457). Much
of this ties back into the discussion on market preserving federalism, though the problem is
generalizable to strong federal systems. When there is horizontal competition, you are penal-
ized for innovation and regulating negative externalities; meanwhile, you are encouraged to
free ride. Essentially, this means social policy will be less generous: No reform of local gov-
ernment political processes can overcome a fundamental weakness of a decentralized political
system. A multiple government system is simply not well suited to carry out distributive
goals, Rose-Ackerman (1983) continues, It permits the wealthy to cluster together and
avoid paying taxes that provide benets to low-income people (37). These forces promote
markets within federal countries far more than in unitary or weaker federal countries. This
may be why three of the ve very strong federal countries - Australia, Canada and the US
- in this study belong to what Esping-Andersen (1990) described a Liberal welfare states.
These are states that favor the market over redistributive policies, at least relative to other
types of welfare capitalist states. However, the other two strong federal states examined
here, Germany and Switzerland, are generally thought to have strong welfare states. These
two cases may have built up larger welfare states for dierent reasons. Germany's constitu-
tion more or less requires redistributive welfare policies. In 2010, the German constitutional
court ruled reforms that reduced entitlements to be unconstitutional because the reforms
failed to provide a dignied minimum income (Pommereau, 2010). So German federalism
might avoid the pitfalls of competitive dereguation because of nationalized constitutional
guarantees. Feld (2000) suggested Switzerland was able to avoid signicant reductions in
redistributive policies because of Swiss-style democracy, which prefers referenda and encour-
ages direct democracy.
So we might expect that strong federalisms will have less generous social policies, either
because of the vetos making the passage of new laws dicult or because of horizontal scal
competition. Of course, the way around such a race to the bottom is to nationalize preferred
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redistributive policies. However, this is not always possible, and the nature of federalism
means that even when nationalizing such policies in the national legislature, there will still
be federally generated vetos that prevent majority preferences from becoming law. Such a
federalist complexion in national legislatures, as the next section will show, distorts resulting
policies.
1.6.1 Social Policy: US versus Canadian Federalism
The muli-directional eects of the federalist state's social policy is demonstrated by the
nature of American and Canadian federalism. The two cases dier, among other things, by
the socio-economic interests of regions that advocate for welfare policies. In the US, few
Americanists would be surprised that Southern states are poorer and recieve disproportional
benets from the rest of the country, yet these very states have long fought against the
nationalization of more generous social polices. Indeed, Lange (1993) suggests that social
policy reforms to level the playing eld were pushed for by European states with the highest
social standards during the Maastrict Treaty negotiations, while poorer European states
didn't want to give up a comparative competitive advantage. In the American context, poor
Southern states don't want to yield thier comparative advantage. That is, low-labor costs
and inferior worker rights (un-friendly union policies) relative to the rest of the country. Due
to the nature of the committee system in the US Congress, Southern politician were able
to take advantage of seniroity rules to impede the nationalization of more generous social
benets, despite such benets being the preference of the majority of the country.
Yet, the Canadian case demonstrates that poorer regions can also seek to maximize
national social benets. Poorer provinces on Canada's Atlantic region were able to extract
generous social benets paid for by the national government: A signicant transfer of income
from the wealthier regions of Canada. The seasonal nature of the Atlantic region's economy
made unemployment benets necessary to maintain living standards and local wage rates.
Despite some retrenchment of Canadian social benets in recent decades, the disposition
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of Canadian federalism meant the Atlantic region's preferences led legislators from wealth-
ier regions to acquiesce to more generous social policies than they would otherwise have
preferred.
Another contrast between the US and Canada is viewed from minority preferences for
particular policies, social or otherwise. The fact that poorer Canadians in the Atlantic were
able to extract more generous benets is partly derived from their voting power in the na-
tional parliament. In the US, the African-American population is dispersed over the states
and don't claim a majority population in any set of states, meaning the African-American
community has never had powerful voting blocs represented in the Congress, particularly
in the Senate.22 This lack of representation, compounded in the Senate, has made African-
American interests virtually entirely unrepresented through the history of American govern-
ment - and, thus, the history of American public policy.23
So the multi-directionality of policy outputs in federal systems seems to be quite clear.
Federal systems don't necessarily lead to more or less generous social polices. What does
seem to be the lesson of these cases is the importance of institutional veto points in federal
systems. The US and Canada produced less generous welfare policies than the majority of
the country would have preferred and more generous policies than the majority of the country
would have preferred, respectively. In both cases, a minority diproportionately inuenced
policy outcomes. In other instances, such minorities vetoed, either directly or implicitly, the
preferred policy of a majority of a federalist state. The importance of regional preferences
on policies (and the legislation process) is clear: A minority can can exert disproportional
inuence on policies preferred by the majority.
Thus, we might expect the challenges that social policy laws create for a government
would make passage of new laws exceptionally dicult, particularly for governments featuring
more veto points. If the US or Canada were unicameral-unitary states, then it is certainly
22In 2013, New Jersey elected Cory Booker (D) to the US Senate, making him just the fourth African-
American elected to the US Senate in all of American History.
23For a longer discussion of the dierences between US and Canadian federalism and policy see Pierson's
1995 article in Governance (467-472).
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possible the policy preferred by the majority whould have been passed. The US would have
more generous welfare policies and Canada less generous. However, the federal nature of
these countries propelled minorities to disproportionately inuence outcomes.
Should an important law have to go through two houses of a legislature with relatively
equal powers, would that not make its passage signicantly more dicult? Would malap-
portionment mean a minority could prevent a law desired by a substantial majority? Or for
that matter, could the nature of federalism propel a minority to block majority preferences?
Could ocials in an upper chamber prevent the implementation of the peoples will? The
answer to each of these questions seems to be yes. If this is the case, it would then seem
that federal systems feature more veto points. So will more federally generated veto points
reduce the number of new laws passed and increase policy stability? It is this important




This study employs multiple analyses to answer its questions. Two dependent variables
will be used to determine dierent levels of signicant laws passed by each country in the
universe of this study. OLS regressions are used to test the two levels of signicant laws
- very signicant and signicant - and a time-series approach is then used with Social
Security laws, the very signicant laws, to account for potential variation over time. Each
analysis generally supports the hypotheses of policy stability in strong federal and bicameral
countries.
In all, 20 countries are included. Each of these are OECD states that have been demo-
cratic for the entire time period considered: 1980 to 2011. Of these countries, two are North
American,24 two in the Pacic25 and the rest are European 26. No Eastern European countries
are considered because they were non-democracies for the rst decade of the study. Japan
is the only county without Western culture, but it is included because of its comparatively
unique federal-bicameral dynamics.
The time period examined was based on three criteria. First, there is a reasonable amount
of data available for each country within the given time period. Moving back into the 1970s,
1960s or further, there is simply less good data available. In particular, moving further
back would have further limited the conclusions that could be drawn from the pooled data
analyses. Second, years that clearly fall within the neo-liberal era. This means retrenchment
of welfare states in OECD countries would have been underway. (One question I'm interested
in, completely aside from the research question, is what type of welfare states will be able
to reform their social policies. Though this question is not explicitly related to the theory
24US and Canada.
25Australia and Japan.
26Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
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considered, it is important and interests me nonetheless.) Third, each country considered
was a democracy for each year considered and had at least one election under its belt. Taken
together, this is a reasonable standard for choosing a time period to study. Though the data
would be dierent if all post-WWII years were considered, I do not expect the impact of
institutions on production of new laws to be much dierent.
The countries considered range from unitary to federal and unicameral to bicameral.
However, only four can be considered both strong federal and strong bicameral: Australia,
Germany, Switzerland and the US. Three countries are considered both unitary and uni-
cameral: Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. The other 13 countries place somewhere in
the middle along the unitary-federal and unicameral-bicameral scale. For instance, Canada
is considered a very strong federal country, but demonstrates only moderate bicameralism.
While Denmark is unicameral, but features some moderate federal features. Since the con-
centration is on democratic welfare states, a great many other countries are excluded, but the
veto players theory is considered to apply generally to democratic political institutions. The
generalizability of this study will have to be considered by the reader. I am only concerned
with a universe of 20 advanced democratic welfare states.
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2 Variables
The variables considered here aim to test the veto players theory as relates to the veto power
of bicameral-federal institutions. So I employ variables that might predict the number of
signicant new laws passed by each country. The dependent variable is signicant laws passed
over the time period. The independent variables are strengh of bicameralism, measured in the
symmetry-congruency dimensions, and strength of the federal state. Additionally, a number
of control variables are used to consider alternative explanations for passage of signicant
laws.
2.1 Laws
The dependent variable is the number laws passed over the time period considered. This
variable is captured in two measures that dier in thresholds of signicance and types of
welfare state policy. The rst is the number of social security laws made by governments
over the 31 year period. The source for these laws is the US Social Security Administra-
tion's (SSA) reports on social security around the world.27 This source has advantages and
disadvantages as a measure of signicant laws passed. The advantage is the extremely high
threshold for signicant, which should give an added degree of condence to the results
predicting signicant laws passed. These laws concern old-age income and disability and sur-
vivors benets. Among the countries considered, there was a mean of 3.4 laws passed with
a standard deviation of 2.76. The twenty countries passed between 0 and 9 laws. Clearly,
these laws are relatively rare, which means they are useful measures of signicant legislaion.
However, this high threshold is also a weakness. Because new social security laws are con-
cerned here, this measure misses out on certain reforms that should be considered important.
For instance, Reagan's 1983 reforms to US Social Security were quite important though not
counted as a law because it was modifying an existing law passed in the 1930's.
27The US SSA publishes these reports every six months for four regions around the world (Europe, Amer-
icas, Africa and Asia/Pacic) in collaberation with the International Social Security Administration.
49
Yet, the German Riester reform of the early 2000's is included. This, in my opinion,
lends additional advantages to this measure. This reform, like many others included in the
measure, introduced the state's promotion of private pensions that encourage capital-funded
second and third pillars of old-age provision28(Wilke 2003: 2). So the advantage comes in
identifying the introduction of very signicant new laws that expand the welfare state, but
also new laws that encourage sustainable welfare policies. A key real-world interest raised
by this measure is capturing movement towards new pillars of old-age income, which is not
centeral to the hypothesis, but is important and interests me nonetheless. Perhaps certain
institutional structures will better allow future governments to respond to scal pressures
wrought by, what the World Bank (1994) called, the old age crisis.
The second measure used to capture the dependent variable includes more laws with
a lower threshold. While still signicant legislation, this measure captures much more
legislation than the other measure. This measures the number of International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) conventions ratied during the time period. The data, which comes from
the Comparative Political Data Set I (CPDSI), counts the total number of ILO conventions
ratied (including conditional ratications) minus the conventions denounced for each year.
To utilize this data, I counted the changes of ratications between years and found the total
for the time period considerd. 29 The ILO laws passed among the 20 countries range from 7
to 60. The mean ILO laws passed was 22.95 with a standard deviation of 12.58. Issues could
be taken with this measure for its signicance in relation to national symbolism, budgets,
extent of regulation and more. Yet Tsebelis (1999) employs a similar measure of signicant
that is found in a legal encycopedia, and all the laws mentioned in the encyclopedia are
also in an ILO database30 (597).
28The pillars of pension income were laid out in a seminal 1994 World Bank paper. The rst pillar is the
pay-as-you-go state pension plan (US Social Security), the second a occupational-based pension (401(k)s),
and the third is based on private savings.
29For instance, the ILO conventions in Italy between 1999 and 2002 were 89, 92, 91 and 93. I counted the
total number of changes between each year, so for this four year time period the ILO laws would be counted
as 6 because any changes to the status quo, regardless of direction, are considered laws. Laws were totaled
for each country from 1980 to 2011.
30The 1999 Tsebelis article considers a much smaller time period, 1981-1991, than this study.
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2.2 Bicameralism and Federalism
The independent variables, bicameralism and the federal state, were retrieved from CPDSI
and based on measures of these concepts from Lijphart (2012). The data for these cover
1981-2010. I do not consider losing one year at the beginning and one at the end of the
time period signicant threats to the ndings as these variables are very stable over time. In
fact, among the countries considered between 1980 and 2011 only Belgium experienced minor
modications when it adopted a more federal system during 1993 constitutional reforms that
took eect in 1995 elections. The position of each country along a federal-bicameral space
is provided in Figure V.
The measure of bicameralism is captured in an index ranging from 1 to 4. On this scale, 1
is considered weak bicameralism or unicameralism and 4 is considered strong bicameralism.
Strong bicameralism will feature an upper chamber with democratic legitamacy, constitu-
tional powers symmetric between chambers and malapportionment. The most signicant
problem with this measure is its failure to capture dierences among similar system's malap-
portionment. Overall, however, I feel this is a good measure that appropriately captures
bicameralism, whatever its shortcomings may be.
Federalism is considered as ranging in the index from 1 to 5. The index considers 1 a
unitary state and 5 a strong federal state. Five countries (Australia, Canada, Germany,
Switzerland and the US) rate as strong federal states and four countries (Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg and Portugal) rate as unitary states. The other 11 countries fall somewhere in
the middle. This measure was opted for over another measure, a dichotomous variable that
simply considered states to be federal or unitary, beause of its ability to capture a greater
range of federal characteristics. These characteristics may act more storngly in certian
countries than others, even though both may be considered federal. Such characteristics may
aect behavior of legislators, allocation of resources and impact of legislation. Therefore,
capturing some of the nuances among federal systems was considered important.
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Figure V: Country Location on a Federal by Bicameral Space
Note: Hypothesis suggests that policy will remain most stable for countries in the bottom
right corner of gure. Australia, the US, Switzerland and Germany are each considered as
strong bicameral (4) and strong federal (5).
2.3 Controls
A number of control variables were included in the analyses. Among the OLS analyses using
pooled data, controls include the percentage of increase in total social spending between
1980 and 2011, an executives-parties measure, percentage change in elderly population (age
65 and older), and ination. Social spending and elderly population are somewhat obvious
controls: By predicting laws that mostly deal with old age social spending, controls for
old age and social spending must be considered to have greater condence in the results.
Increasing ratios of the elderly to the working age population creates dicult challenges
for policy makers, and thus one might expect policy-makers in places where this problem
is more severe to face more pressure to make new old-age income laws (Gruber and Wise,
2007). Ination is used by governments to adjust benets, it aects revenues, cost-of-living
adjustments and is an important factor in political analyses (Sahr, 2004). Finally, Lijphart's
executives-parties dimension is included to explain the role of other important institutions.
The executives-parties variable consists of ve criteria: 1) Concentration of executive
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powers in single-party majority cabinets or power-sharing amongst a coalition of multiple
parties; 2) an executive that dominates the legislature or a balance of power between an
executive and a legislature; 3) a multi-party or two-party system; 4) electoral rules based
on PR or FPTP; and 5) pluralist or corporatist interest groups.31 By considering these
governmental institutions, compiled within a single dimension, I can see the manner and
degree to which these factors play into legislating signicant new laws. This is likely the
most important control as it should be considered the alternative institutional explanation.
Meaning, perhaps, the executive-party dimension provides a better explanation than federal
institutions for the likelihood there will be greater production of signicant new laws or
greater policy stability.
The event history analysis also includes controls for ination and the executives-parties
dimension, though both vary over time in the data. The executives-parties measure is a proxy
taken from the CPDSI and is more sensitive to changes between governments/elections. This
analysis also includes controls for unemployment and Rae's legislative fractionalization. The
legislative fractionalization control considers the impact of partisanship on the production
of new laws. Taken together, controls in the event history analysis should account for
most alternative economic, institutional or partisan explanations. The controls in each of
the analyses presented should also provide enough accounting for the generally accepted
alternative explanations considered in comparative literature on the production of new laws.
31The pluralist interest group system, according to Lijphart, is composed of competitive and uncoor-




The analyses in this section generally support the hypotheses and make strides toward an-
swering the research question. The rst section includes OLS regressions using pooled data.
The second section utilizes an event history analysis. There are a few inconsistencies between
the results, but generally the analyses provide consistent armation of the hypotheses. Es-
sentially, strong federal institutions do seem to promote policy stability, while weaker federal
institutions demonstrate a greater ability to pass signicant new laws.
3.1 Pooled data approach
The rst measure of signicant laws, social security laws, demonstrates a clear and negative
correlation with increasing strength of both federalism and bicameralism. Simple two-way
comparisons show stronger federal and bicameral systems are less likely to pass more laws.
However, federalism demonstrates a stronger correlation (-0.68) with social security laws than
bicameralism (-0.48). The relationships between social security laws and both federalism and
bicameralism are demonstrated graphically in gures VI and VII.
Federal and bicameral systems also appear to be less likely to pass new social security
laws when considered with other variables. Federalism, bicameralism and the executives-
parties dimension are negatively correlated with social security laws. So, as the strength of
each variable increases, it becomes less likely that signicant new social security laws will
be passed. However, as is demonstrated in Table II, the executives-parties measure is not
signicant. In Table II Model III an interaction eect with the federal and bicameral variables
is signicant, while the executives-parties is not. The interaction eect is also signicant in
Model V, in which the controls for elderly population, social spending, ination (logged)32
and executives-parties are not. This suggests that federalism and bicameralism do indeed
32The interaction eect was still signicant when ination is not logged, while each other variable wasn't
signicant either. Though results were not very dierent, it is the logged ination variable that is given
in the table. This is because there is a fairly large disparity of cumulative ination among the countries
considered, so it seemed most appropriate to log the variable to reduce this disparity while still capturing
ination's eect.
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Figure VI: Strength of the Federal State and New Social Security Laws
Figure VII: Strength of Bicameralism and New Social Security Laws
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act as veto players by preventing the passage of new social security laws.
In Model IV, federalism is signicant, while bicameralism isn't. This might suggest
that federalism plays a larger role as a veto player. Indeed, federalism and bicameralism
are considered independently in models I and II; federalism is signicant at p<0.01, while
bicameralism is signicant at p<0.05. Therefore, one might walk away with the idea that
federalism plays a stronger veto player role than bicameralism. This may be the case, but
I would suggest that bicameralism may not demonstrate signicance in Model IV because
of some degree of collinearity. In any case, both federalism and bicameralism do seem to
inhibit the production of new laws.
Tabel II, however, also demonstrates the limitations of this analysis. Model VI shows
signicance in no variables. The model is included because an interaction should change
the interpretation of the main eect's coecients, so the table will give a fuller picture by
including interactions alone, the main eects alone and then together (Gelman and Hill,
2006). And indeed the coecients of the main eects are changed. Bicameralism in Model
VI, now has a positive coecient, while federalism remains negative. This seemed to be a
recurring theme througout the study: The federal state seems to inhibit the production of
new laws more than the strength of bicameralism. To analyze the table from another angle,
the federal state may not depend on bicameral strength (and vice versa) to predict new laws.
Since there is some degree of collinearity between the federal state and bicameral strength,
the resulting coecients in models with both independent variables would likely be aected.
So, there is some strong evidence that federalism and bicameralism play the role of veto
players on signicant new social security laws, along with enough results to cast some doubt
upon that evidence. The case with ILO laws, however, is a bit more murky. There is again a
convincing correlation between federalism and legislating ILO laws (repealed or ratied), as
well as bicameralism and ILO laws. When analyzing ILO laws and the independent variables
there is a slight reversal of the strength of relationships. Unlike social security laws, ILO laws
are more strongly correlated with bicameralism (-0.507) than federalism (-0.468). Though,
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Table II: OLS Regression of Social Security Laws
as demonstrated in tables VIII and IX, both are negatively correlated with ILO laws - which
again suggests the salience of federal and bicameral institutions to the veto players theory.
This relationship, however, is not as convincing with ILO laws when adding certain controls.
Table III shows the relationships among the variables when regressed against ILO laws.
Again, federalism and bicameralism are signicant compared to the executives-parties dimen-
sion, as is demonstrated in models I and II. This, paired with ndings using social security
laws, gives greater condence that federalism and bicameralism play a very important role
in preventing the passage of new laws. Perhaps more so than strength of executives-parties
institutions. The four simple two-way graphs presenting social security laws and ILO laws
against both federalism and bicameralism implies that strong federal and bicameral systems
will likely produce fewer new laws during a given time period. Clearly, however, such re-
lationships could be spurious, and I dare not suggest causal relationship - at least, at this
point.
Each of the variables in Table III has a negative relationship, except executives-parties
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Figure VIII: Strength of the Federal State and ILO Laws
Figure IX: Strength of Bicameralism and ILO Laws
58
Table III: OLS Regression of ILO Laws
in Model I, with the production of new ILO laws. While bicameralism and federal states
are signicant, executives-parties is not. To further support the importance of federal states
and bicameralism, Molel III shows an interaction eect using the two variables that is also
signicant. Finally, Model IV puts everything together and, again, all signicance is lost.
The brief discussion in previous pages about collinearity and whether or not bicameralism
depends upon federalism (and vice versa) to predict new laws should be kept in mind when
considering these results. Whether or not it is signicant, the federal state and strength of
bicameralism clearly exert some eect on the passage of new ILO laws.
Yet, when including the other control variables (ination, elderly population, social
spending) in models, signicance in all variables is lost. Though not shown in the table,
these results might cast some doubt upon the importance of federal institutions as veto
players. Still, I would submit that these variables (with the exception of ination perhaps)
aren't as relevant to ILO laws as social security laws because ILO laws more largely deal
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with labor, business and markets than social expenditures - though the two are not com-
pletely dierent. In any case, the lack of signicance should signiy the limits of federal
institutions as predictors of policy changes to the status quo. Still, as we see from gures
VIII and IX, as well as results reported in Table III, there is clearly a negative relationship
between strength of federal institutions and the production of new laws. The extent and
importance of this relationship, I will leave to the reader's interpretation of results presented
here. Though there is still further evidence of the importance that federal institutions play
in the production of new laws.
3.2 A time sensitive approach
The event hisory analysis is a time sensitive approach to examining of the production of new
social security laws during the time period considered. Methods laid out by Beck, Katz and
Tucker (1998) are used in this analysis. Time-dummies are added to the analysis to address
the assumption of independence that is present in traditional event history analyses. An
ordinary logit model without time-dummies is also presented in Model I of Table IV. Again,
the results demonstrate the importance of federal institutions to the likelihood of passing
new laws.
The results are consistent with ndings from analyses using pooled data. Model I, an
ordinary logit, shows the signicance of federalism relative to the other predictors. The
federalism coecient is negative, which, again, means as the strength of federalism increases
fewer new social security laws are produced. Bicameralism is not signicant in Models I
or II, but like in Model IV of Table II, this may be a result of collinearity. Indeed, such a
problem is considered to be aggravated by the use of time dummies.
Models II-VI, which include the time-dummies, further support the hypotheses. Bicam-
eralism, federalism and the interaction each demonstrate signicance within at least one
model and have negative coecients. Taken alone, bicameralism (in Model II), federalism
(in Model IV) and the interaction (in Model V) are signicant at *p<0.05. So we can see
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Table IV: Event History Analysis of Social Security Laws (1980-2011)
the very important role that federal institutions played, at least among 20 countries be-
tween 1980-2011, in hampering the production of new social security laws. Interestingly, the
executive-party control is negative across all models in Table IV, whereas it had no consis-
tent direction in the previous regressions using pooled data. This could perhaps be taken as
demonstrating the importance of time, since the measure in this analysis changes over the
years. The executive-party control is also signicant at p<0.05 in Model III, which suggests
its importance to certain a degree.33
In my opinion, the most interesting results are in Model VI of Table IV. Here we see an
interaction together with main eects and the federal state is still demonstrating signicance,
unlike the previous analyses. This, again, suggest that the strength of the federal state is
33The executive-party dimension includes domination of the executive over the legislature, or vice versa,
so its not surprising that most strong bicameral systems feature executives with powers more proportional to
their respective legislatures. Whereas executives capable of dominating the legislature don't generally have
to deal with strong upper chambers. The US President would probably like to dominate the Senate, but he
can't!
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Figure X: Probability of New Laws in Unitary to Federal States
Note: Based on Model II in Table IV.
more important than the strength of bicameralism in forcing policy stability on some given
system. Throughout all of the analyses, strength of the federal state has been a consistently
signicant predictor of new laws passed. This suggest to me that it is very important,
perhaps more so than bicameralism.34 Another important takeaway from this table (and
the previous ones) is that federal institutions seem to consistently predict production of new
laws better than the alternative institutional explanation: The executives-parties dimension.
Institutions have to matter in regard to the legislation process and policy outputs. And it
seems that federal institutions matter more than executive-party institutions.
To further examine the importance of federal institutions, Figures X and XI show the
marginal eects of federalism and bicameralism. There is a very clear downward tragectory
as the strength of federalism and bicameralism increases. A weak federal or unitary state
(federalism=1) shows there is approximately a 17 percent probability of passing a new social
security law, whereas strong federal states (federalism=5) could expect approximately a six
34Though, again, issues of collinearity need to be kept in mind.
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Figure XI: Probability of New Laws in Unicameral to Strong Bicameral Systems
Note: Based on Model II in Table IV.
percent probability. Likewise for strength of bicameralism, though its eect isn't quite as
pronounced. There is approximately a 14 percent chance of passing a new social security law
in a unicameral system, while there's about a nine percent chance of it passing in a strong
bicameral system.
These time sensitive results, along with pooled results, clearly show that federal institu-
tions matter. These institutions aect the likelihood and diculty of legislating new welfare
laws. For a deeper insight, the cumulative hazard rate of the analysis in Model II is shown
in Figure XII.
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Figure XII: Cumulative Hazard of Social Security Laws
Note: Based on Model II in Table IV.
4 Issues and Limitations
Overall, I feel the results are fairly convincing. It seems likely that stronger federal states and
bicameral systems will experience greater policy stability than unitary or unicameral systems.
However, the methods, measures and assumptions necessary to make these conclusions bring
up a number of issues that cast some doubts upon the ndings.
The rst issues would be with the methodological approaches taken. I used pooled data
and an event history analysis. The former is rather elementary in that it simply pools the
number of laws passed over a certain period of time and utilizes a stable index of institutional
measurements. The problems here are obvious. Time matters, governments matter, leaders
matter, ect. There are multiple issues that arise from pooling data and drawing conclusions.
Though in defense of such a measure, I would point the the fact that two pooled analyses
were conducted with dierent levels of signicant laws passed. These two levels draw on
dierent realms of law, so it might be reasonable to suggest that there is something behind
the, relatively, consistent ndings between both levels of signicant laws and realms of laws.
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Nonetheless, time is very important and these pooled regressions neglected it. So the event
history analysis was conducted to consider time's importance.
This type of analysis is unique in the veto players literature - to my knowledge such
an analysis has never before been conducted in testing this theory. Yet, this measure still
introduces some issues. For instance, it does not take into account instances where multiple
laws were passed in one year. Though this is exceedingly rare, it is still a limitation of such a
method. Also, event history methods are mostly seen in American or International Relations
literature and hasn't been widely used in comparative literature. So its implications and
validity as a method haven't been fully assesed for drawing substantive conclusions in the
comparative context. The traditional issues that arise from this method also limit what we
can draw from these conclusions. Left censoring issues are obviously present, though the
problem exists for most analyses of this nature. The time-period considered was based on
the three criteria mentioned earlier, but welfare retrenchment is often considered to have
begun in the 1970s. So the second criteria, years falling in the neo-liberal era, may not even
be all that relevant this method. So left censoring had some impact on the resluts, though
I leave it to the reader to decide the extent of the impact. Surely there are additional issues
with these methods, and there is always room for improvement. Yet, I'm comfortable with
drawing cautious conclustions from results that appear to be generally consistent throughout
the study.
The second issue arises from the measurement used. Both of the variables of interest
have issues. The measure of federal states is attempting to capture a vague, unclear and
controversial term (Duchacek, 1987). So it is impossible to appropriately capture such a
term. The federalism index generally correlates tax revenues with dierent levels of gov-
ernment in the manner one would expect. But the outliers leave room for reticence. The
problem with this measure is not so much that we cannot be sure Portugal is unitary and
Germany federal. They are. But rather if Denmark and Sweden or Belgium and Austria are
more federalist than the other in some way. Arguments could be made in both directions
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for each case.
Meanwhile, bicameralism is also a murky concept, but somewhat more clearly dilineated
than the federal state. Here issues would come with the measure capturing dimensions of
bicameralism. Again, the issue is not that the US is bicameral and Greece is unicameral,
but the systems in between. Both Canada and Italy are considerd to have a bicameral
strength of three-out-of-four. Canada's Senate has constitutional powers in theory, but not
in practice. Italy's Senate has constitutional power in both theory and practice. Yet, Italy's
Senate has more democratic legitimacy than Canada's. Still, both bicameral systems are
considered a three on the bicameral index. There is a lot not being captured here. However,
for both of these measures the perfect was not supposed to get in the way of the good. And,
in general, these indices seem to appropriately capture the intended concepts. Dwelling on
the assumptions made here is not terribly helpful, as assumptions are necessary in social
sciences. In this study, the statistical and measurement assumptions were made because
they seemed the best available. So despite a series of problems, I would argue, the results




The role played by federal institutions appears to be an important predictor of the likeli-
hood that signicant new laws will be passed by a government. These ndings generally
suggest that strong federalism, particularly strong federal-bicameral systems, will inhibit
governments from passing new laws. If this result is accepted, then further questions are
raised about the mechanisms that produce policy stability from federal institutions. Future
work will want to examine the voter-legislator linkages in federal systems that encourage
conict. As well as the role of parties in federal systems. We have some strong evidence
that parties in bicameral systems will behave dierently because members want to protect
their institutional terf, regardless of party aliation (Tsebelis & Money, 1997; Roller, 2005).
However, the aect of federalism on some given legislator's behavior in bicameral systems
has not been fully explored. How might similar bicameral systems, such as Italy or Japan
and the Netherlands, dier in legislative behavior because of the scope of the federal state.
The Netherlands has a bicameral system roughly proportional in bicameral strength to that
of Italy and Japan, but is much more federal than either. So what role does the federal state
play in inuencing legislators behavior?
More to the point of this particular study, scholarship on the importance of malappor-
tionment should be pursued. Here, the bicameral measure simply subsumed whether or not
a legislature featured malapportionately distributed seats, not the extent of malapportion-
ment between countries or within a country over time. If this could be shown, it would lend
further credence to the idea that malapportionment can act as a kind of veto point in and
of itself. An eye ball analysis using the malapportionment coecients from Samuels and
Snyder (2001) would suggest that malapportionment does act as a barrier to legislating new
laws. Though, obviously, such an analysis does not make for a convincing argument.
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Besides bicameralsim, Tsebelis' other characteristic of federalism was qualied majorities.
This raises additional questions for its role as a veto point generator in federalist systems.
We know the US Senate has a qualied majority rule, known as the libuster. The results
from this study's data show that the US passed very few laws, supposedly due in part to its
strong federalist system. So if we also consider qualied majorities in a federal institutional
analysis, then the extent of veto points in the US federal system would be even greater. And
the problem of passing new laws compounded for American governments.
Since the primary realm of laws examined pertain to those in the universe of welfare
laws, we could reasonably extrapolate from these results that it will be exceedingly dicult
to reform welfare policy in strong federal-bicameral countries. Basically, any change to the
status quo will be exceedingly dicult in countries with strong federal institutions. The
US, Germany, Australia and Switzerland each face dierent challenges in regard to their
respective welfare regimes (particularly for old-age income policies). Canada's actuaries
suggest their pension program is sustainable for about 75 years,35 which is quite good, but the
aggravating aspects of federalist institutions will likely eect it as well. The US has recently
debated minor reforms to its Social Security system, most recently a change to costs-of-
living adjustments.36 Proposals have also been oated about increasing the retirement age.
However, not surprisingly, these proposals have gone nowhere. Germany has actually seen
several welfare reforms over the last decade-and-a-half, but some have been stricken down as
unconstitutional. As strong judiciaries are yet another veto player, the general theory that
more veto players increases policy stability seems to be further demonstrated. Meanwhile, it
is Switzerland's penchant for cantonal-level (as well as national and local) direct democracy
that has staved o signicant welfare reforms. Such referenda, again, are yet another type
of veto player contributing to policy stability. So a good takeawy might be that Canada,
the US, Germany, Switzerland and Australia, based on the results of this study, should
35Canada Pension Plan Invesment Board 2013 Report from the Chief Acuary of Canada.
36The change is known as a chained consumer price index, which is just a dierent measure of ination
from that being used now. The proposal, as of 2013, would address about 20 percent of the Social Security
program's shortfall, according to the SSA.
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also experience immense diculties in reforming welfare policies. Futhermore, aside from
federalist vetos, there are numerous other veto players in each of these countries. It seems a
good bet to assume a stable status quo for each of these states. On the opposite end of the
spectrum, Greece has experienced anything but policy stability (or just general stability) in
both recent years37 and over the course of this study.
37Clearly, however, many of Greece's signicant new laws in recent years were exogenously coerced.
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5 Conclusion
Overall, we can draw from this study that federal institutions signicantly hamper the ability
of governments to make new laws. Each of the hypotheses seem to be validated given the
results of the study. The research question seems to be answered: Yes, indeed, strong federal
institutions do increase the number of veto points in the legislation process and promote
policy stability. Federalism matters. Weak federal institutions (unicameral-unitary systems)
may be subject to the, perhaps foolish, will of a majority, but they can pass signicant
laws. Strong federal institutions (strong federal-bicameral systems) will make it exceedingly
dicult to legislate new laws, but this brings about some degree of stability. This leaves me
to ask one nal normative question: If you were writing a constitution, what system would
you choose?
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